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In Japan, a lot of attention has been given to the UK takeover
 
regulations enforced by the Takeover Panel, a body specialized in
 
takeover issues.However, there are many misunderstandings on the
 
basic points.The section below indicates such misunderstandings and
 
describes the reality of the UK takeover regulations.
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(a) Does the mandatory offer rule basically apply in any case?
According to the mandatory offer rule, when a person or group
 
acquires shares carrying30%or more of the voting rights of a
(１)
company,
they must make a cash offer to all other shareholders of the company
 
at the highest price paid in the12months before the offer was announ-
ced.This is one of the core features of the UK takeover regulations.
However,in reality,the mandatory offer rule has been applied to only
 
a few cases,five to ten per year.Dispensation is granted in many cases
 
even when the requirements for application of this rule are satisfied.It
 
often occurs in the case of acquiring voting rights upon issue of new
 
shares(
(２)
whitewash),and there are some other cases where this rule does
 
not
(３)
apply. The Rules contained in the Code are applied flexibly in
(１) We should note the difference from the rule for making a tender offer in
 
Japan (holding one-third of voting rights). The Japanese rule considers the
 
ratio of voting rights“to be acquired as a result of the offer,”whereas the UK
 
rule considers the ratio of voting rights “held at the time the offer is being
 
made.”
(２) Whitewash refers to cases where the injector of cash or the offeror,who
 
acquires shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights, can avoid the
 
mandatory offer rule by obtaining the shareholders’approval.In this case,the
 
injector should prepare a whitewash document equivalent to an offer document
 
by stating therein who the injector is and what his experience is,as well as in
 
what business the injector is engaged and what links exist between his business
 
and the offeree company’s business,and submit the document to the Executive
 
with a checklist via the offeree company’s adviser to obtain approval,and then
 
also obtain approval of at least half of the independent shareholders (share-
holders other than the people who will acquire allotments of new shares and
 
their concerned parties)who are present at the general meeting of shareholders.
(３) The mandatory offer rule does not apply in the following cases: (i)
whitewash ;(ii)where shares or other securities are charged as security for a
 
loan and such security is enforced (enforcement of security for a loan);(iii)
where a company that is in such a serious financial position issues new shares
 
to save the company(rescue operations);(iv)where a person,due to an inadver-
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schemes of arrangement that aim for rehabilitation of the offeree
 
company with the permission of the court.No specific rule exists in the
 
Code on organization restructure by selling and buying a company’s
 
assets (except during the offer period).
Most tender offers made in the United Kingdom are not mandatory
 
but voluntary.The offeror must make an offer to all shareholders,but
 
if it holds shares carrying less than30% of the voting rights at the time
 
that the offer is being made,it can make a voluntary offer and does not
 
have to make a cash offer at the highest
(４)
price.A party with no voting
 
right can also make a voluntary offer to all shareholders.However,in
 
the case of a voluntary offer,the offeror can state detailed acceptance
 
conditions in an offer
(５)
document,whereas in the case of a mandatory
 
offer,the offeror is allowed to state only one condition,holding more
 
tent mistake,comes to hold shares carrying more than50% of the voting rights
(inadvertent mistake);(v)where holders of shares carrying 50% or more of the
 
voting rights state in writing that they would not accept such an offer,or shares
 
carrying 50% or more of the voting rights are already held by one other person
(shares carrying 50% or more of the voting rights);and(vi)a person interested
 
in non-voting shares becomes upon enfranchisement of those shares interested
 
in shares carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of a company(enfranchise-
ment of non-voting shares).
(４) In addition to Rule9, the obligation to make a cash offer at the highest
 
price also applies under Rule6and Rule11.
(５) Takeover Code,Rule10-Rule13.Typical conditions include the following :
(i)a specific act should be conducted to maintain the offer;(ii)the supervisory
 
authorities should approve control transfer when the offeror acquires a license
 
necessary for continuing the business of the target company;(iii) the offer
 
should be withdrawn in the event of any material adverse change occurring to
 
the offeree company.(A Practitioner’s Guide to The City Code on Takeovers
 
and Mergers 2008/2009, at 155-159.)However, the Panel basically does not
 
permit subjective conditions(conditions that exclusively depend on the offeror’
s decisions)(Rule13).
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than 50% of the voting rights,and it should make a cash offer at the
 
highest price within the preceding 12months.
Although it is true that the mandatory offer rule is,without a doubt,
one of the cores of the UK takeover regulations, this rule is multi-
structured and is applicable only in a few cases,in reality.UK special-
ists do not stress this fact or may not know it well.However,this does
 
not mean that the mandatory offer rule exists only in its framework.It
 
could rather be said that the existence of the mandatory offer rule fully
 
functions as a deterrent against easy transfer of control;its purport
 
also has an influence even in cases where the rule does not
(６)
apply.
(b) Are partial acqusitions prohibited?
In the United Kingdom, not all tender offers are whole offers. A
 
partial offer can also be made to acquire part of the shares of the
 
offeree company.However,in order to make a partial offer,the offeror
 
should obtain permission from the Panel and must not acquire shares of
 
the offeree company within 12months before and after making the
 
offer.If the offeror acquires control of the offeree company as a result
 
of the partial offer,it should obtain approval of shareholders carrying
 
more than50% of the voting rights who are independent of the offeror
(Rule36.5).Due to this restriction,partial offers are rarely made in the
 
United Kingdom.
On the other hand, the vast majority of dispensation from the
 
mandatory offer rule relates to whitewash or “an offer resulting in a
(６) For instance,the Code provides that a person who satisfies certain require-
ments may acquire shares carrying more than 30% of the voting rights of the
 
offeree company before making an offer (Rule5.2).However,because of the
 
existence of the mandatory offer rule, a shareholder who intends to make a
 
voluntary offer is made to give up the idea of acquiring shares carrying more
 
than 30% of the voting rights before making an offer.
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partial acquisition,”80 to 90cases per year according to the recent
 
statistics.Furthermore,if the offeree company has a very small number
 
of shareholders,dispensation may also be granted with the permission
 
of the
(７)
Panel.
(c) Are tender offers coercive?
It has been argued that tender offers could be coercive depending on
 
the conditions or method of the offer, putting pressure on the share-
holders who cannot decide whether or not to accept the offer and force
 
them to sell off shares.From this viewpoint,some people are cautious
 
about expanding the scope of tender offers. This issue of a coercive
 
offer would not arise if the offer is made on condition that the offeror
 
purchase shares from all shareholders who wish to accept the offer,and
 
if it fails to acquire shares carrying 50% of the voting rights,the offer
 
should be void. If this condition is proposed in advance, takeover
 
defense would be basically unnecessary.This rule is actually in practice
 
under the current tender offer system in the United
(８)
Kingdom.
(d) Are takeover-defensive measures prohibited?
In fact,it is also possible in the United Kingdom to introduce rights
 
plans and other takeover-defensive measures based on a resolution of
 
the general meeting of shareholders. However, this rarely occurs
 
because there is a strong principle that shareholders, mostly institu-
tional investors,have the right to make a decision.
(e) What are the major reasons for such misunderstandings?
A major reason for such misunderstandings on the basic points
 
concerning the UK takeover regulations is that although the rules
(７) The Takeover Panel,Note to Advisers in relation to Code Waivers(Last
 
revised 20May2006).
(８) Takeover Code,RuLE 9.3(a).
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relating to takeovers are clear, the reality as to how they are im-
plemented (e. g., relationships between various types of offers and
 
exceptions)are not clear to people other than those working on the
 
Panel or at M & A markets(e.g.,people in charge of M & A cases at
 
investment banks and law firms).This situation arises from the fact
 
that most takeover cases in the United Kingdom do not involve courts
 
but are settled through negotiations between the Panel and the parties,
and the detailed information on specific cases does not come out of the
 
Panel,which has an obligation to
(９)
confidentiality(in recent years,the
 
Panel at least releases summary statistics).
In the United Kingdom,a voluntary offer is often called a mandatory
 
offer in the sense that it should also be made to all shareholders.We
 
should note that people in this country are apt to overemphasize the
 
philosophy and significance of the mandatory offer rule.The substan-
tial significance of this rule is its existence as a “strict rule that an
 
offeror must avoid,”and as a result, the rule functions as a deterrent
 
against easy acquisition of shares carrying 30% or more of the voting
 
rights.In practice,the mandatory offer rule usually applies these cases:
(i)the offeror,due to its adviser’s mistake,has acquired shares carry-
ing 30% or more of the voting rights of the offeree company before
 
making an offer;or(ii)the offeror,after making an offer,is likely to
 
be able to acquire a number of shares in bulk in the market,and decides
 
to make a separate offer through the market pursuant to the manda-
(９) It seems that the Panel,in principle,does not disclose the precedent cases
(excluding appeal cases),for fear that the parties might assert the precedent
 
cases while interpreting these cases in their favor despite the difference in facts
 
and situations of individual cases, and this would prevent the Panel from
 
carrying out prompt and flexible responses,as it currently does.
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tory offer rule.
Ⅵ.“Moderate mandatory offer rule”as a basic type
 
and Additional“Strict mandatory offer rule”
“Mandatory offer rule”adopted through Europe is basically applied
 
when more than a certain amount of shareholdings of the target
 
company(basically,30% or one third of voting rights)is acquired(it
 
is different from Japan where“compulsory tender offer”is based on
“the ratio which the offeror is about to acquire”.)The basic type of this
 
rule seems to be very strict.However,if you understand“the balance”
which arises over the rule,it is not so strict after all and could be“a soft
 
cushion”as a deterrent against easy acquisition of control.
In applying mandatory offer rule, inhibitory effectiveness against
 
transfer of control is often pointed out.Mandatory offer rule could not
 
be an obstacle to M & A if an offer is generally made without applying
 
the rule(voluntary offer).
In addition,the ratio of mandatory offer is generally small in transfer
 
of control.In TOB practices in Europe,the offeror generally makes a
 
voluntary offer by holding the buying in the market below threshold of
 
mandatory offer rule (the initial requirement is 30%). In voluntary
 
offer,there is also an“obligation of whole solicitation”.It’s possible to
 
realize“whole solicitation and partial acquisition”by determining the
 
price strategically through voluntary offer(and surplus selling after the
(10)
buying).If these measures are used,mandatory offer rule or obligation
(10) In the US and other countries,attempts at partial acquisition of the voting
 
rights of the target company through a takeover bid have been criticized as an
 
abusive two-tier bid.In Europe,however,such attempts are effectively turned
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of whole solicitation will not be an obstacle basically to business
 
restructuring or hostile takeover.The“obligation of whole solicitation”
is not considered as strict among M & A practitioners in the UK and
 
also in whole Europe.
Further,the UK rule“is‘misunderstood’as a typical example putting
 
everything on TOB”.However,the reality is totally different.In most
 
cases,British companies transfer control by allocation of new shares to
 
third parties using “whitewash”as an “exemption of the TOB rule”
(independent shareholders pass the resolution of general meeting by
 
applying mutatis mutandis only the disclosure regulation in the TOB
 
rule).Principles and exceptions are reversed between the formal rule
 
and the
(11)
reality.In the UK,most TOB cases are voluntary
(12)
offers.This
 
does not mean that mandatory offer rule is toothless.Because the rule
 
itself is strict,the offeror would not easily acquire more than 30% of
 
sharing in the market.We have to understand the mandatory offer rule
 
functions as a deterrent against easy acquisition of control in that
 
meaning.
On the other hand,it is necessary to consider unique social norms and
 
accompanied structures of shareholding in each country from other
 
perspectives. In the UK, it is not preferable to remain as a minority
 
shareholder in a company which has block holders.It is preferable to
 
acquire100% as closely as possible if the ratio of shareholding is more
 
than30%.Therefore,there is little case of acquiring30% to50% voting
 
rights(large volume holding without acquiring control)“as a result of
 
down under the regulations on the consideration to be offered when squeezing
 
out minority shareholders.
(11) See,Takeover Panel,Annual Report.
(12) Id.
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the offer”.
Moreover, in the UK, the mandatory offer rule is also applied to
 
slight adding by more than 30% but less than 50% (Takeover Code,
Rule9.1).Adopting the“strict additional mandatory offer rule”as such
 
will be an effective deterrent against transfer of control in the legal
 
jurisdictions where the ratio of block holders is high.
Ⅶ.Strong “shareholder decision-making principle”
and the preconditions thereof
 
A typical attitude seen within the framework of UK companies law
 
and capital market law,especially in the phase of control transfer by
 
way of takeovers,is a strong “shareholder decision-making principle.”
This principle is completely different from the“principle of maximizing
 
the shareholder value,”which is common among US companies. It is
 
well known that,in the United States,the management is under very
 
strong pressure to maximize the stock price or shareholder value.
Decisions on important matters of a company are made by the manage-
ment and the shareholders,
(13)
equally.
Also in the United Kingdom,a company can introduce a rights plan
(poison pill)based on a resolution of the general meeting of share-
holders.The introduction of defensive measures before an offer period
 
is excluded from the Panel’s regulations,and it is also not restricted
 
under the Companies Act.Furthermore,even after the management of
 
the target company becomes aware that an authorized offer is going to
 
be made in the near future, they can introduce defensive measures if
(13) Professor Paul Davies (Oxford University)describes this situation in the
 
United States as“managerialistic.”
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adopted at the general meeting of shareholders.
However, in the United Kingdom where institutional investors are
 
said to have the strongest power in the market,an attempt to introduce
 
a rights plan (poison pill)usually fails due to strong opposition from
 
such investors,who argue that they would be deprived of the opportu-
nity to sell shares when an offer is
(14)
made.The same applies to other
 
types of defensive measures.For instance,issuing multi-voting shares
 
is not legally prohibited but the issuing company would receive a
 
penalty in the form of a decline in the market price of its shares.It is
 
said that among the companies listed in the United Kingdom,only ten
 
companies or so have issued multi-voting shares as a defensive mea-
sure. Furthermore, new shares must be issued by offering them to
 
shareholders(rights issue).
Thus,there may be no doubt that such strong institutional investors
 
exist behind the UK shareholders’decision-making principle.However,
the UK takeover regulations establish a framework wherein not only
 
institutional investors gain benefits but each and individual shareholder
 
can make a decision independently.The Code provides for fair treat-
ment of shareholders (Principles), and embodies the purport of this
 
principle in Rules 6,9,11,16,and so forth.Rule6,which addresses a
 
mandatory offer,is a typical provision of fair treatment of shareholders
 
under which shareholders may,once an offer is made, receive a pre-
mium and exit from the company.
The precondition for making the strong “shareholders decision-
making principle”work is sufficient information disclosure to share-
holders.For instance,an offer document must cover a number of points
(14) Another large factor is the existence of the investment guidelines for
 
institutional investors(e.g.,Preemption Group Guideline).
早法86巻３号（2011）198
 
including the following :information on the offeror and its strategic
(15)
plan;the offeror’s intention regarding the continued employment of
 
employees of the offeree
(16)
company;a cash flow statement;the offeror’
s intention regarding the transfer of the shares to be acquired and the
 
information on final shareholders(Code,Rule24).
The offer timetable is elaborately designed for shareholders.There is
 
a time when they are not in an offer period,a time when they are in an
 
offer period without a price,and a time when they are in receipt of an
 
offer at a very clear price.At each stage,shareholders know precisely
 
what is going on (Rules 30 to 34). There is also a provision on the
 
period during which the potential offeror should announce and publish
 
its intention to make an offer,called put up or shut up(Rule2.5).This
 
provision effectively prevents the offeror from announcing a vague
(15) In Japan,there is a critical view about obliging the offeror to disclose a
 
detailed business plan.In the United Kingdom,although the offeror is obliged
 
to give an explanation about a business plan and its reasonableness, it is not
 
required to disclose the details of the plan (particularly when making a cash
 
offer for all shareholders).It is also rare in this country for the offeree company
 
to repeatedly ask detailed questions to the offeror about its business strategy.
The offeror does not have to disclose more information than required under the
 
Code(Rule24.1).However,when the offeree company suggests any incorrect
 
or unclear statements in the document,the offeror corrects such statements as
 
advised by the Panel.
(16) The offeror should state its“employment policy”in an offer document.The
 
employees(or their representative)have the opportunity to state their opinions
 
on the employment policy but do not have the right to have the offer with-
drawn.In Japan,the necessity to disclose an employment policy is sometimes
 
questioned on the grounds that it will be irrelevant to shareholders after they
 
sell off shares.On the other hand,in the United Kingdom,this requirement is
 
established based on the concept that shareholders must be appropriately
 
informed,before making the decision of whether or not to sell off shares,about
 
what kind of company the offeror is as well as its strategy and experience.
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intention to make an offer or from withdrawing the intention,thereby
 
confusing the management of the offeree company or manipulating
 
stock price.
Ⅷ.Regulation for the advisers and“internal sanction”
In the Takeover Code,there is a paragraph in the Introduction which
 
specifically says that advisors,and especially financial advisors,have
 
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Code. So if a client
 
doesn’t, there’s the ability for the Takeover Panel to discipline the
 
advisor.It helps to give the Panel technical jurisdiction over financial
 
advisors and other advisors.
The threat of disciplinary action,because,if a client which is neither
 
or a target company,if it fails to comply with the Code or something
 
that the Panel says,the Panel is likely to be angry with or take some
 
action against both the company and also its financial advisor, and
 
possibly its other advisors.
And so the financial advisor has a very great incentive to make sure
 
that its client does what it should do. So financial advisors help the
 
Panel to enforce the Code in practice,or at least help the Panel to make
 
sure that their clients comply with the Code.
And advisors worry hugely.A lot of situations don’t reach the public
 
domain,because banks will press the Panel very hard for there to be a
 
private censure rather than a public one. If there’s a public censure,
often the bank will get rid of the lead investment banker on the team.
Moreover,for many years, if a bank was publicly censured, then the
 
investment banker who was the lead man on the job would leave the
 
bank.Banks don’t like getting criticism of mistakes or poor behavior,
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because it affects their standing in the market,and it’s a very competi-
tive market.
And they will push very hard with the Panel to have a private
 
censure.And often, a number of advisors,where the Panel has said,
“OK,we will give you a private censure, but you have to put your
 
bankers through mandatory training in these areas to reinforce how
 
important it is.”It’s something M & A practitioners in the UK end up
 
doing on a reasonably regular
(17)
basis.
Ⅸ.Core of the problem in relation to the establishment
 
of a specialized body for takeover regulations
 
Examining individual rules contained in the UK Takeover Code,we
 
can find that many of these rules seem to be conducive to dealing with
 
various problems that have already occurred or are likely to occur in
 
Japan.It follows that if we introduce these rules one by one,we will
 
finally be able to introduce something close to the Code. However,
when inquiring into the possibility of introducing and implementing
 
some rules,such as the mandatory offer rule,we should carefully design
 
the content of the rules while bearing in mind the difference in terms of
 
the shareholding structure between the United Kingdom and Japan,and
 
other European countries.
Suggestions from the UK Takeover rules include not only the
 
mandatory offer rule and the tradition of self-regulation,but also the
 
issues like sufficient and reasonable information disclosure or speedy
 
and flexible regulation by experts with support of statutory laws.Those
(17) This view and information was heard in interviews with the M & A
 
Practitioners in the City.
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are also very important factors to remember. We should discuss,
sincerely and seriously,what rules we should or should not introduce
 
into the Japanese law system and whether they should be introduced
 
with or without modification, after fully understanding what the UK
 
Takeover rules are,in a real sense.
The UK Takeover Panel is now a statutory body and it has powers
 
conferred under the Companies Act. At the same time, it has
 
maintained the power to make and use rules,which enables it to retain
 
the advantages in supervision by a self-regulating body.The FSA is a
 
purely statutory supervisory body,but it still has aspects of self-regula-
tion by an industry organization.When considering the introduction of
 
the UK-type takeover regulations into Japan,it is important to ensure
 
that the supervisory body will be given the power to implement take-
over rules promptly and flexibly as well as the capability of achieving
 
personnel recruitment and rotation through exchanges with the private
 
sector,rather than making it exist as a self-regulating (non-statutory)
(18)
body.
For predictability of the related parties,we need to have a detailed
 
rule concerning TOB which causes transfer of control.However,it is
“difficult to write down everything in the detailed rule”including
 
exceptions and considering the characteristics of M &A,it is necessary
 
to have speedy and flexible regulations by
(19)
specialists.
(18) For instance, in Switzerland which has takeover rules and a specialized
 
takeover supervisory body(Übernahmekommission), both similar to the UK
 
counterparts,the financial supervisory body has the power to enforce the rules.
(19) Since the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act contains a number of
 
provisions that are so technical and complicated that it is difficult to under-
stand their meaning after reading them only once,it is often the case that it is
 
possible to attempt a construction that is contrary to the legislative purpose
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Under the existing surcharge system of Japan,even an offeror who
 
has violated the TOB rules shall be subject to a surcharge levied
 
automatically, without room for discretionary judgment, and the
 
amount of the surcharge tends to be
(20)
huge.If consultation-based TOB
 
regulations are made possible, there will be almost no unintentional
 
violation of the TOB rules,and even when a dispute occurs regarding
 
the illegality of an offeror’s action,the offeror will be able to choose a
 
scheme or action that will not be deemed to be against the rules, by
 
consulting with the supervisory body in advance.
When making rules mainly targeting M & A practitioners,it is more
 
desirable to entrust this task to a supervisory body that consists mainly
 
of M & A practitioners and whose organization and powers are speci-
fied by statutory law,rather than to rely on defensive measures in the
 
form of a rights plan whose legal validity is
(21)
unstable.
Assuming that a Japanese version of the Takeover Panel should be
 
established in Japan,what kind of body can it be?It can be established
 
as a new division of the current supervisory body,or established as a
 
completely new organization under joint jurisdiction of several minis-
only based on the language of the Act.This is one of the reasons for calling for
 
consultation-based regulations.
(20) In the JCOM case,the point in dispute was whether KDDI evaded the TOB
 
rule(Article27-2, paragraph (1), item (ii)of the Financial Instruments and
 
Exchange Act,generally known as the one-third ownership rule)by attempting
 
to acquire about 37. 8% of JCOM’s shares through an intermediate holding
 
company. The Financial Services Agency could have levied a surcharge of
 
about 90billion yen on KDDI.
(21) As for the legal instability of rights plans,see Hiroyuki Watanabe,“Nihon-
ban teikuo?ba?paneru no ko?so?”(Designing Japanese version of takeover panel),
Kigyo? ho?sei no genjo? to kadai (Current status and problems on corporate law
 
system),edited by Tatsuo Uemura (Nippon Hyoron Sha,2009),p.21-22.
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tries and agencies.In both cases,the personnel recruitment and rotation
 
will be particularly important.In Japan,personnel exchanges between
 
the public and private sectors have recently become popular in a
 
manner that talented people move from the private companies to
 
government offices on a short-term basis and then go back after being
 
successful in their achievements. The UK Takeover Panel seems to
 
carry out such personnel exchanges and assignments systematically.
Some people propose methods other than creating a specialized body,
such as appointing lawyers who are well versed in market practices as
 
judges (on a temporary basis) or creating a new judicial division
 
specialized in dealing with company law
(22)
cases. However, takeover
 
regulations must be enforced promptly and flexibly by experts before
 
disputes occur,and it would be difficult to achieve this by enhancing the
 
judicial functions.In view of this,it is not that we can choose only one
 
out of two options, enhancing the judicial functions or creating a
 
specialized organization for takeover regulations,but we should explore
 
both possibilities.
What must be done now is to create,as soon as possible,an environ-
ment in which company executives can sincerely believe that improving
 
business efficiency is the most powerful defense against takeovers,and
 
to prevent inappropriate takeovers by reforming the tender offer
 
system to the globally acceptable
(23)
level. When in the City, even US
(22) For instance,Naohiko Matsuo,“Baishu?Bo?eisaku to Ko?kai Kaitsuke Kisei
 
no arikata(Kinyu?Sho?ji no Me)”(Takeover defensive measures and desirable
 
takeover rules (Eye of financial commerce)),Kinyu Shoji Hanrei No. 1299
(2008),p.1.
(23) Kenichi Fujinawa,“Kensho?:Nihon no Kigyo?Baishu?Ru?ru―Raitsu Puran
-gata Bo?eisaku no Do?nyu? ha Tadashikattaka”(Study on Japan’s takeover
 
rules:Was it the right choice to introduce rights plans as takeover-defensive
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compann the Takeover Code itselfs of the City and do not demand that
 
the rules be changed to the US style.Taking,as a model,the UK rules
 
that form part of the international takeover rules,we will be able to
 
show a sufficient basis for argument against the one-sided criticism of
 
the closed nature of the Japanese
(24)
market.
Even after incorporating into statutory law,the UK Takeover Panel
 
retains its own regulatory methods.I believe that by fully understand-
ing the conditions that support its regulatory structure and enforce-
ment, we will see a light guiding us in the direction to which the
 
Japanese takeover regulations must proceed.
※［correction］Vol.86,No.2,p.296,Note(21)
(wrong）Watanabe, op. cit.,“Seiteiho? ni Motozukanai Kigyo? Baishu?
Kisei to sono Henyo?” ((Non-statutory takeover regulations and
 
changes).
↓
(right）Watanabe, “Seiteiho? ni Motozukanai Kigyo? Baishu? Kisei to
 
sono Henyo?:Eu kigyo?baishu?shirei no kokunai ho?-ka to eikoku teiku
 
o?ba?paneru”［Non-statutory takeover rules and their metamorphoses:
Transportation of the EU Takeover Directive into national law and the
 
UK Takeover Panel］; H. Kanda(ed.), Shijo? torihiki to sofutoro?
［Market transactions and soft law(Tokyo 2009),p.74-82.］
measures?),Shojihomu No.1818(2007),pp.22-23.
(24) Tatsuo Uemura, Hiroyuki Watanabe, “Kigyo? Baishu? Ru?ru no arikata:
Eikoku Sanko?ni Ho?katsuan Tsukure”(Desirable takeover rules:Make a draft
 
following the UK rules), The Nikkei, March 12, 2008［Keizai Kyo?shitsu
(Economic lesson)］
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